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An Unwelcome Burden: Sexual
Harassment, Consent and Legal
Complaints
BETHANY HASTIE*
The legal definition of sexual harassment was set down thirty years ago in the Supreme Court
of Canada decision of Janzen v. Platy Enterprises as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature
that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences
for the victim of the harassment.” Remarkably little has changed in the interpretation and
application of these elements since Janzen was decided. However, both legal and social
norms concerning sexual misconduct and consent have substantially developed in that time.
This article unpacks the problematic consequences flowing from the treatment of consent
in sexual harassment complaints under human rights law and argues for a shift in the legal
principles governing sexual harassment complaints. It draws support from criminal law and
tort law, each of which has shifted towards an affirmative consent standard due to similar
problems and concerns regarding reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes.
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THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT was set down over thirty

years ago in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Janzen v. Platy Enterprises
as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally afects the work
environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences for the victims of the
harassment.”1 Tis defnition has been interpreted as requiring three essential
elements to establish a complaint of sexual harassment under human rights law:
(1) conduct of a sexual nature; (2) that is, or ought reasonably to be known to
be, unwelcome;2 (3) that produces adverse consequences for the complainant.
Remarkably little has changed in the interpretation and application of these
elements since Janzen was decided. However, both legal and social norms
concerning sexual misconduct and consent have substantially developed in that
time. In particular, the #MeToo movement in 2017 initiated a new wave of
social, political, and legal attention to the issue of sexual harassment. Tese events
have created heightened awareness and sensitivity to this pervasive issue that is
known to afect many Canadians. A 2014 Angus Reid poll found that forty-three
per cent of women and twelve per cent of men in Canada reported experiencing
sexual harassment in their workplace.3 Further, evidence suggests that legal claims
concerning sexual harassment are increasingly pursued through human rights

1.
2.
3.

[1989] 1 SCR 1252 at 1284 [Janzen]. For further elaboration on the conduct element of the
defnition, see Mahmoodi v UBC and Dutton, 1999 BCHRT 56 at para 136 [Mahmoodi].
Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 140. Concerning the elements of the test for sexual
harassment as a whole, see Janzen, supra note 1 at 1284; Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 135.
Angus Reid Institute, “Tree-in-ten Canadians say they’ve been sexually harassed at work, but
very few have reported this to their employers” (5 December 2014) at 2, 11, online (pdf ):
<angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014.12.05-Sexual-Harassment-at-work.pdf>.
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tribunals rather than civil litigation, due to relaxed evidentiary standards and a
less adversarial atmosphere.4
Tis article argues for a shift in the law of sexual harassment, in order to bring
the legal principles in line with contemporary social and legal understandings of
consent. In earlier research, I considered how the presence of the “unwelcome”
element in sexual harassment law in Canada facilitates the introduction of
gender-based myths and stereotypes.5 I found that these myths and stereotypes may
operate to undermine a complainant’s credibility and to infuence the reasoning
and outcome of the complaint.6 Tis research builds on existing scholarship
that problematizes the “unwelcome” element of sexual harassment law.7 It also
presents similarities to issues that are known to plague victims of sexual violence
in the criminal justice system.8 Noted issues regarding the historical treatment
4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

Sean Fine, “Ontario Human Rights Tribunal gains steam as alternative route for sexual
assault cases” (3 April 2018), online: Globe and Mail <www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/
article-workplace-sexual-assault-survivors-claim-victory-at-human-rights>. Note that
civil courts do not independently provide a basis for a legal claim of discrimination to be
brought. Such a claim must be tied to, for example, a constructive or wrongful dismissal
claim. It is also worth noting that few complainants take formal legal action when faced with
workplace harassment, and fewer of those proceed to a full hearing.
Bethany Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment: Assessing the Efectiveness of Human
Rights Law in Canada” (August 2019), online: Peter A Allard School of Law <commons.
allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs/500> [Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”]; Bethany Hastie,
“Workplace Sexual Harassment and the “Unwelcome” Requirement: An Analysis of BC
Human Rights Tribunal Decisions from 2010 to 2016” (2020) 32 CJWL 61 [Hastie,
“Unwelcome Requirement”].
Hastie, “Unwelcome Requirement”, supra note 5 at 63.
See e.g. Arjun P Aggarwal & Madhu M Gupta, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 3rd ed
(Butterworths, 2000) at 120-37; Janine Benedet, “Book Review of Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace by Aggarwal and Gupta” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall LJ 843 at 846 [Benedet,
“Book Review”]; Janine Benedet, “Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the
Unwelcome Infuence of Rape Law” (1996) 3 Mich J Gender & L 125; Hastie, “Unwelcome
Requirement”, supra note 5 at 69.
Hastie, “Unwelcome Requirement”, supra note 5. For examples of similar issues in the
criminal justice system, see Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Afrmative Consent in Canadian
Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41 Akron L
Rev 865 [Gotell, “Rethinking Afrmative Consent”]; Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault
Law, Credibility, and ‘Ideal Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010)
22 CJWL 397; Isabel Grant, “Intimate Partner Criminal Harassment through a Lens of
Responsibilization” (2015) 52 Osgoode Hall LJ 552; Elaine Craig, Putting Trials on Trial:
Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal Profession (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018)
[Craig, Putting Trials on Trial]; Elaine Craig, “Section 276 Misconstrued: Te Failure to
Properly Interpret and Apply Canada’s Rape Shield Provisions” (2016) 94 Can Bar Rev 45;
Lise Gotell, “When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual History
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of consent in relation to sexual ofences, and the ways in which gender-based
myths and stereotypes have operated to place the burden of establishing a lack of
consent with the victim, led to the adoption of an afrmative consent standard
in criminal law. Similar reasoning, evidencing a concern for the problematic
consequences that would fow from a requirement for a plaintif to establish a
lack of consent, led the Supreme Court of Canada to afrm that consent is a
defence to the tort of battery in the case of Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of
London v. Scalera.9
Afrmative consent standards have produced their own set of challenges.10
Scholars have critiqued the ways in which the emphasis on a binary consent
standard in law, in relation to sexual conduct, problematically oversimplifes and
reduces narratives and experiences about sexuality and sexual encounters. Tese
critiques disrupt traditional (conservative) assumptions that conceive of sexual
violence as centrally about power.11 Scholars have further critically examined
how the norm of afrmative consent in criminal law may lay the foundation for
a repressive moral order and instill a narrative of weakness and helplessness in
those meant to be protected.12 Common to the concerns raised about the legal
construction of consent is an attentiveness to the ways in which a binary “yes or
no” approach to consent to sexual conduct is unrefective of reality,13 and imposes
a gendered lens on sexual interactions that entrenches notions of women’s
vulnerability. Moreover, scholars in the United States, especially, have been vocal
about the sexual “sanitization” of the workplace, in light of the advent and spread

9.

10.

11.
12.
13.

Evidence and the Disclosure of Personal Records” (2006) 43 Alta L Rev 743; Susan Ehrlich,
“Perpetuating—and Resisting—Rape Myths in Trial Discourse,” in Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed,
Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice, and Women’s Activism (University of Ottawa
Press, 2012) 389.
Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera, 2000 SCC 24 [Scalera]. Unlike the
criminal law context, which has seen a series of cases develop and interpret the relevant legal
principles and provisions relating to afrmative consent, Scalera presents the sole, leading
authority on consent as a defence to (sexual) battery in tort law.
See Aya Gruber, “Consent Confusion” (2016) 38 Cardozo L Rev 415 at 430 for a review of
contemporary challenges and debates surrounding the concept of afrmative consent. See
also Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton
University Press, 2006) [Halley, Split Decisions].
See e.g. Heidi Matthews, “#MeToo as Sex Panic” in Bianca Fileborn & Rachel Loney-Howes,
eds, #MeToo and the Politics of Social Change (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) at 267.
See e.g. Janet Halley, “Te Move to Afrmative Consent” (2016) 42 J Women in Culture &
Society 257 [Halley, “Afrmative Consent”].
See e.g. Gruber, supra note 10.
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of prohibitive policies regarding workplace sexual conduct and relationships.14
Te formulation of sexual harassment law, it is argued, has resulted in repressive
workplace policies and their implementation at the organizational level.15 Tese
policies operate to suppress sexuality and intimacy in the workplace, to discipline,
and to control workers for a broad range of behaviour, giving rise to similar
concerns about overbreadth that have arisen in the context of criminal laws and
afrmative consent.16
Te introduction of the “unwelcome” element in Janzen may have been
intended to guard against the very kind of “sanitization” that Vicki Schultz
critiques, by excluding consensual or “welcomed” sexual interactions.17
In practice, however, it has produced signifcant obstacles for complainants, most
often women, to establish their complaint of sexual harassment against (most
often) men. Tis article unpacks the problematic consequences fowing from
the “unwelcome” element in sexual harassment complaints under human rights
law, as governed by provincial human rights legislation,18 and argues for a shift
in legal principles that would require respondents to establish “welcomeness”
rather than requiring complainants to demonstrate “unwelcomeness.” I draw
on the comparisons of criminal and tort law to illustrate the signifcance of
considering who bears the burden of establishing consent (or lack thereof ) and
why that matters. In other words, I draw on these comparisons to advance a
structural critique: requiring a complainant in a sexual harassment complaint to
establish a lack of consent requires her to shoulder an unfair burden and creates
inappropriate space for gender-based stereotypes to infuence the arguments,
analysis, and outcome of legal complaints. As such, I take, as a starting point,
that the law currently relies on consent-based elements, and my critique focuses
on who ought to bear the burden of establishing (non)consent in the context of
sexual harassment complaints under human rights law. Nonetheless, the broader
consequences and normative values communicated by a continued reliance on
consent and by continued regulation of sexual behaviour in the workplace,
as documented by existing scholars, must be borne in mind.
14. See e.g. Vicki Schultz, “Te Sanitized Workplace” (2003) 112 Yale LJ 2061 at 2090; Vicki
Schultz, “Te Sanitized Workplace Revisited” in Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E Jackson
& Adam P Romero, eds, Feminist and Queer Legal Teory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable
Conversations (Ashgate, 2009) at 65 [Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”].
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. See e.g. Basic v Esquimalt Denture Clinic and another, 2020 BCHRT 138 at para 98 [Basic].
18. For examples from British Columbia and Ontario, see e.g. Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996,
c 210 [BC Code]; Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H-19 [Ontario Code].
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In Part I, I review the development and doctrinal interpretations of sexual
harassment law under human rights legislation in British Columbia and Ontario.
I discuss how the “unwelcome” element allows for the problematic introduction
of gender-based myths and stereotypes, through which a complainant’s
credibility may be undermined and her lack of consent questioned. I draw on
human rights decisions from British Columbia and Ontario to illustrate these
claims.19 In Part II, I review how the tort of battery as well as criminal laws
addressing sexual ofences have each adopted an “afrmative consent” standard
in order to respond to similar noted issues concerning reliance on gender-based
myths and stereotypes in assessing legal claims. I conclude in Part III by drawing
together these analyses to argue for a similar shift in the legal principles governing
sexual harassment complaints under human rights law, establishing how existing
principles of human rights law are sufcient to properly assess complaints of
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.

I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW AND THE
“UNWELCOME” ELEMENT
Sexual harassment complaints under human rights law are governed by a test that
includes the requirement to establish that the respondent knew or ought to have
known that their conduct was “unwelcome.”20 Tis “unwelcome” element has
been critiqued as improperly responsibilizing women for harassment-avoidance,
placing an undue burden on complainants, focusing the inquiry on a
complainant’s own behaviour and conduct, and implying that sexual conduct in
the workplace is presumptively welcome.21 My existing research has illustrated
19. Tese decisions were retrieved as part of a larger study examining the trajectory of
sexual harassment law from 2000 to 2018 in British Columbia and Ontario. See Hastie,
“Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5.
20. Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 140.
21. See e.g. Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 7 at 131-32; Benedet, “Book Review”, supra note 7 at
846; Kaitlyn Matulewicz, “Law and the Construction of Institutionalized Sexual Harassment
in Restaurants” (2015) 30 CJLS 401 at 402-403 [Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual
Harassment”] citing Marlene Kadar, “Sexual Harassment: Where We Stand; Research and
Policy” (1983) 3 Windsor YB Access Just 358; Sandy Goundry, “Sexual Harassment in the
Employment Context: Te Legal Management of Working Women’s Experience” (1985)
43 UT Fac L Rev 1; Fay Faraday, “Dealing with Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Te
Promise and Limitations of Human Rights Discourse” (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ 33;
Kathleen Gallivan, “Sexual Harassment after Janzen v Platy: Te Transformative Possibilities”
(1991) 49 UT Fac L Rev 27; Judy Fudge, “Rungs on the Labour Law Ladder: Using Gender
to Challenge Hierarchy” (1996) 60 Sask L Rev 237; Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality:
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that this element facilitates the introduction of, and reliance on, gender-based
myths and stereotypes to undermine a complainant’s credibility and raise consent
as an issue for a complainant to disprove.22 Tis Part reviews the evolution and
contemporary doctrinal interpretations of sexual harassment law, with a focus
on the “unwelcome” element, and examines how this element manifests the
above-noted issues in contemporary case law. Tis demonstrates the problems
attending the “unwelcome” element, providing a foundation from which to
argue for a shift in legal doctrine.
A. SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS: LEGAL ELEMENTS AND
DOCTRINAL INTERPRETATIONS UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Sexual harassment as a form of discrimination was frst defned by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the 1989 Janzen decision and can be broken down into three
primary elements: (1) conduct of a sexual nature; (2) that is, or ought reasonably
to be known to be, unwelcome; (3) that produces adverse consequences for
the complainant.23 In the thirty years since Janzen was decided, case law has
continued to interpret and refne these elements.
Conduct falling within the defnition of sexual harassment may be physical
or psychological, overt or subtle, and may include verbal innuendoes, afectionate
gestures, repeated social invitations, and unwelcome firting, in addition to more
blatant conduct such as leering, grabbing, or sexual assault.24 While physical
conduct, such as unwanted touching, is blatant and often readily recognizable as
sexual harassment, various kinds of verbal conduct are also recognised as sexual
harassment. Verbal sexual harassment can include sexual innuendo, jokes, taunts,
and comments about a person’s appearance or sexual habits, as well as quid pro quo
harassment, where a supervisor or person in a position of authority makes sexual
advances, invitations, or demands against a subordinate employee.25 However,
as the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal most recently afrmed in Eva,

22.
23.
24.
25.

Te Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2010); Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5 at 25; Kathryn Abrams,
“Te New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment” (1998) 83 Cornell L Rev 1169 at 1221.
See Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5.
Janzen, supra note 1 at 1284.
See Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 7 at 14-18.
Gallivan, supra note 21 at 30. For an analysis of the conduct element in sexual harassment
complaints at the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, see also Bethany Hastie,
“Assessing Sexually Harassing Conduct in the Workplace: An Analysis of BC Human Rights
Tribunal Decisions in 2010-16” (2019) 31 CJWL 293 [Hastie, “Tribunal Decisions”]. For a
comparative analysis between Ontario and British Columbia, see Hastie, “Workplace Sexual
Harassment”, supra note 5.
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not every negative incident or incident connected to sex constitutes harassment.26
Moreover, a single comment or instance of verbal conduct is generally insufcient
to establish harassment. A single comment may only be sufcient to ground a
complaint where that comment is particularly egregious in nature.27 Often, this
means that where verbal conduct is at issue, a pattern of conduct or repeated
instances of conduct will be needed to establish the complaint.
Tribunals and courts have come to understand the legal test for determining
whether conduct was “unwelcome” as “taking into account all the circumstances,
would a reasonable person know that the conduct in question was not welcomed
by the complainant?”28 Te test thus asks whether the harasser knew, or ought to
have known, that the conduct was not welcomed. Te burden is on a complainant
to establish this element of her complaint. However, this does not require a
complainant to establish that they actively protested the conduct, such as through
verbal communication.29 Tis has been afrmed in many cases, including recently
in Ontario in Bento v. Manito’s Rotisserie & Sandwich: “[A] complaint, protest,
or objection by an applicant is not a pre-condition to a fnding of harassment and
it does not mean that the behaviour or conduct wasn’t unwelcome.”30 Further,
Mahmoodi makes clear that conduct may be both “tolerated and yet unwelcome
at the same time.”31 Nonetheless, in some cases, issues arise where a complainant
is unable to marshal some evidence of protest or objection, whether verbal or
through more subtle physical gestures or facial expression.32
In response to shifting legal and social norms, recent case law from British
Columbia suggests a trend towards increasing reliance on an objective assessment
of whether the respondent ought to have known that their conduct would be
“unwelcome”. Tis is most evident in the recent British Columbia Human Rights
Tribunal decision in Basic v. Esquimalt Dental Clinic, where the Tribunal Chair
formulated the test as: “[W]hat would reasonable people, who have taken the
trouble to inform themselves on the topic of gender myths and stereotypes, know

26. Eva Obo Others v Spruce Hill Resort and Another, 2018 BCHRT 238 at para 80 [Eva], citing
Hadzic v Pizza Hut Canada (cob Pizza Hut), 1999 BCHRTD No 44 at para 33.
27. Pardo v School District No 43, 2003 BCHRT 71 [Pardo]. See Hastie, “Workplace Sexual
Harassment”, supra note 5 at 20.
28. Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 140.
29. Ibid at paras 140-41.
30. 2018 HRTO 203 at para 108, citing SS v Taylor, 2012 HRTO 1839 at para 72.
31. Mahmoodi, supra note 1 at para 141.
32. See e.g. Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5 at 26-30; Hastie, “Unwelcome
Requirement”, supra note 5 at 75-78.
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about the type of interactions that occurred?”33 Moreover, in Te Employee v. Te
University and another (No. 2), the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
directly acknowledged the disproportionate burden the unwelcome element
places on complainants, stating,
[i]t has been thirty years since Janzen was decided, and it may be time to revisit
whether this requirement unfairly places the burden of establishing a lack of consent
on a complainant. Some argue there is support for moving to an afrmative consent
standard that shifts the burden of proof to the respondent.34

Te requirement that the complainant establish that the alleged harasser knew
or ought to have known that the conduct was “unwelcome” has been widely
criticized for the inappropriate burden it places on complainants, predominantly
women, to avoid harassment and protest harassing conduct.35 Te individual
and transactional focus of the test also minimizes the systemic nature of sexual
harassment and gender-based discrimination in the workplace, as with other
contexts.36 Moreover, as the next section will demonstrate, this element of sexual
harassment law has further provided an entry point for gender-based myths
and stereotypes to infuence the legal analysis. Te reliance on these myths and
stereotypes is not unlike similar problems that have been widely documented
in the context of sexual ofences and gender-based violence in the criminal
justice system.37

33. Basic, supra note 17 at para 102.
34. 2020 BCHRT 12 at para 175.
35. See e.g. Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5; Hastie, “Unwelcome
Requirement”, supra note 5; Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual Harassment”, supra note
21 at 403 citing Marlene Kadar, “Sexual Harassment: Where We Stand; Research and Policy”
(1983) 3 Windsor YB Access Just 358; Aggarwal & Gupta, supra note 7 at 123-28; Gallivan,
supra note 21 at 36; Fudge, supra note 21 at 244; Faraday, supra note 21 at 50; Sheppard,
supra note 21 at 83; Kaitlyn Matulewicz, “Law’s Gendered Subtext: Te Gender Order of
Restaurant Work and Making Sexual Harassment Normal” (2016) 24 Fem Legal Stud 127.
36. See e.g. Hastie, “Tribunal Decisions”, supra note 25 at 299.
37. See Gotell, “Rethinking Afrmative Consent”, supra note 8; Craig, Putting Trials on Trial,
supra note 8; Randall, supra note 8. Myths regarding victim behaviour and women’s sexual
availability have been used to undermine the credibility of female complainants of sexual
assault in the criminal justice system.
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B. ESTABLISHING “UNWELCOME” CONDUCT IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
COMPLAINTS: THE INTRODUCTION OF GENDER-BASED STEREOTYPES
AND IMPLICATION OF CONSENT

Te issues examined in this article are grounded by an in-depth case law analysis of
sexual harassment complaints under human rights law.38 Tis study reviewed 191
identifed substantive decisions on the merits for workplace sexual harassment at
the British Columbia and Ontario Human Rights Tribunals from 2000 to 2018.39
In this study, I found that numerous cases raised concerns about the introduction
of gender-based myths and stereotypes, particularly in relation to understandings
of consent and establishing that the impugned conduct was “unwelcome.” Tis
section discusses three ways in which the “unwelcome” element invites scrutiny
of a complainant’s lack of protest or objection in assessing the complaint:40 frst,
where a lack of protest or objection is relied upon directly in determining that the
conduct was not reasonably understood as “unwelcome”; second, where a lack of
protest or objection is used to undermine the complainant’s credibility or version
of events; and, third, where a lack of protest or objection is suggested to function
akin to implied consent in settings where the alleged conduct is normalized
in the workplace.
In some cases, a lack of protest or objection was directly considered as a factor
in assessing whether it was reasonable for impugned conduct to be understood as
“unwelcome”. For example, in Gibbons v. Sports Medicine Inc,41 while fnding that
certain physical conduct constituted sexual harassment,42 the Tribunal denied
other aspects of the application. In particular, in assessing conduct that included
a statement that commented on the complainant’s body and invited her to “a
boat ride without her bikini top,” the adjudicator found that “in the absence
of any protest by [the complainant], they did not in my view constitute sexual
38. Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5. As a form of discrimination, human
rights law and human rights tribunals are the central legal arena involved in adjudicating
complaints of sexual harassment. Complaints of sexual harassment may be brought before a
civil court where they relate to an independent legal claim subject to that jurisdiction, such as
wrongful or constructive dismissal. Cases involving physical misconduct may also give way to
criminal charges.
39. Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5 at 10.
40. See also ibid at 25-26. Te “unwelcome” element also functions in ways that create obstacles
for a complainant to establish her case and which raise doubts concerning her credibility
based on related gender myths beyond the issue of protest or objection. Tese include issues
related to normalizing sexual behaviour in the workplace, and participation by a complainant
in prior or related behaviour in the workplace.
41. 2003 HRTO 26.
42. Ibid at para 32.
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harassment.”43 Here, the lack of express objection or active protest to conduct
appeared instrumental in fnding that such conduct was not sexual harassment.
Similarly, in Wollstonecroft v. Crellin et al,44 the fact that the complainant did not
object to the respondent’s discussion of sexual topics with her, and did not bring
allegations until months later, was specifcally mentioned by the adjudicator,45
although the complaint was ultimately found justifed.
In Anderson v. Law Help Ltd, the adjudicator appeared to rely on active
protest as the pivotal point at which the respondent knew, or ought to have
known, that his conduct was “unwelcome”.46 Tat case revolved substantially
around a series of text messages. Te applicant had not been “completely blunt in
rejecting his sexual advances” in the beginning of the text exchanges.47 However,
when she later attempted to end their exchange and “clearly explained why she
was not interested in having a relationship with him,”48 the adjudicator found
that, “[a]t that point, a reasonable person would have known that any further
sexual advances would be unwelcome.”49 Tis suggests an interpretation of the
“unwelcome” element that relies on active protest or objection.
Tese cases illustrate how a lack of active protest or objection may negatively
infuence the assessment of whether the conduct in question was understood to
be “unwelcome”. Tis, in turn, impacts the complainant’s ability to establish the
prima facie complaint, despite legal principles which suggest that active protest
or objection is not required to meet this element of a complaint. Moreover, this
focuses the inquiry on the complainant’s own behaviour in assessing the complaint.
Tough these analyses are not framed as whether or not the complainant
consented to the conduct, requiring the complainant to establish the impugned
conduct as “unwelcome,” and relying on evidence of active protest or objection in
order to do so, efectively responsibilizes the complainant to clearly communicate
non-consent. In other words, the “unwelcome” element, where it relies on some
indicia of protest or objection, presumes, as a default, that such conduct would
be “welcomed” and consented to, requiring the complainant to bear the burden
of establishing a departure from this presumption or default position.
A lack of protest or objection may also function to undermine a complainant’s
credibility. Tis may be especially so where a complainant’s character or
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Ibid at para 33.
2000 BCHRT 37.
Ibid at para 84.
2016 HRTO 1683.
Ibid at para 77.
Ibid.
Ibid.

430

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

narrative does not “ft” with assumptions about victim behaviour and the wider
gender-based stereotypes to which they attach. For example, in Han v. Gwak
and Nammi Immigration,50 while the adjudicator found that the individual
respondent made comments of a sexual nature, it was also determined that the
complainant was “a person with strong opinions, who is entirely capable of
making her thoughts and feelings known,” and therefore that it was “unlikely
that she would not have spoken to [the respondent] had his comments made her
uncomfortable.”51 Te adjudicator further surmised that it was therefore unlikely
that the complainant had found the comments to be “unwelcome”.52 In this
case, the complainant’s character may have infuenced how her lack of protest or
objection was interpreted and understood. Similarly, in Woods v. Fluid Creations,
the tribunal member noted perceived inconsistencies in the complainant’s
response to the alleged conduct, which negatively impacted her credibility.53
Specifcally, the tribunal member remarked that “the complainant’s assertion that
she did not protest because she was a probationary employee does not explain
why she said nothing to any co-worker. Tis alleged meekness seems inconsistent
with the statement in her afdavit that she ‘spun around to face [Mr. McPhee]
about to freak out on him and tell him of.’”54
As Han and Woods illustrate, the search for, and reliance on, explanations
for a lack of protest or objection that ft assumptions being drawn about the
complainant’s personality or character, or about victim behaviour, may provide
another entry point for the use of gender-based myths or stereotypes to
infuence the adjudication of the “unwelcome” requirement. Tis is particularly
problematic given the many reasons why individuals are known not to complain
or speak out when faced with sexual harassment, such as a fear for job security
or of not being believed.55 Tese examples also point to the potential for implicit
bias and assumption-based reasoning to infuence the analysis and outcome of
the complaint. Tese cases further entrench a link between the “unwelcome”
element and a presumption of consent. Tey illustrate how an adjudicator’s
own perspective or expectations about how an individual would or should react
in similar circumstances may infuence an assessment about whether and how
that individual would communicate non-consent in particular settings. Tis
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

2009 BCHRT 17.
Ibid at para 35.
Ibid at para 70.
2012 BCHRT 110.
Ibid at para 50; Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”, supra note 5 at 77.
See e.g. Sheryl L Johnson, Sexual Harassment in Canada: A Guide for Understanding and
Prevention (LexisNexis Canada, 2017) at 195.
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may similarly operate to create a presumption of consent absent a compelling
explanation and evidence to counter it.
A lack of protest or objection may also infuence the understanding of
whether the impugned conduct was “unwelcome” where a work environment
is sexualized or particular conduct within it is normalized. In Dix v. Te Twenty
Teatre Company,56 the application included numerous incidents of alleged
harassment. Te Tribunal dismissed part of the application, which dealt with
allegations of hugging and kissing in the workplace. Te applicant alleged that two
board members solicited hugs and kisses on the cheek from her.57 Te adjudicator
found that, in the context of this workplace, such behaviour was not uncommon,
and as such, it was not reasonable for the respondents to know that their conduct
was “unwelcome” absent express objection or active protest.58 In this analysis,
the adjudicator acknowledged that there are “many work environments in the
corporate world where hugging and cheek kissing are not the norm.”59 However,
the adjudicator took the complainant’s particular work environment as a neutral
backdrop, which suggests that the applicant would have had to actively protest
this conduct in order for it to be understood as “unwelcome”. In that case, the
applicant also raised an argument that an afrmative consent standard ought to
be applied, which was rejected.60
Similar to Dix, the complaint in Sleightholm v. Metrin and another (No. 3)61
revolved around a workplace in which certain conduct was normalized. In that
case, part of the complaint related to the sharing of a dream in which the
complainant was in a bath. While the adjudicator acknowledged that “[t]he
sharing of the ‘bath dream’ might easily be construed as amounting to sexual
harassment” in another context, the fact that “dreams and the interpretation of
them were frequently the subject of conversation” in this workplace, and that the
complainant was “the instigator of many of these conversations,” changed things.62
In addition, the complainant also described conduct that included hugging and
blowing kisses. However, the adjudicator found that this did not constitute a
breach of the Code, and that such behaviour “was normal for the ofce they were
in and was not protested by her or any other employee.”63 While the adjudicator
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

2017 HRTO 394 [Dix].
Ibid at para 26.
See ibid at paras 32-36.
Ibid at para 33.
Ibid at para 35.
2013 BCHRT 75.
Ibid at para 56.
Ibid at para 73.
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took issue with the complainant’s credibility for numerous other reasons, these
passages suggest some reliance on indicia of protest or objection in assessing
whether the conduct in question ought to have reasonably been understood as
“unwelcome” in light of the particular organizational culture and behaviour.
Like Dix, the workplace environment was taken as neutral backdrop, despite a
recognition that such behaviour might otherwise constitute sexual harassment.
As a result, both Dix and Sleightholm suggest that, where a respondent is able to
lead evidence that the conduct complained of is “normal” in the particular work
environment, there may be greater reliance on indicia of protest or objection in
order to ground a fnding that the conduct was “unwelcome”.
Te “unwelcome” element of sexual harassment law creates potential for
many problematic interpretations associated with consent and credibility to
infuence the arguments, analysis, and outcome of a complaint. Most directly, the
“unwelcome” element invites decision-makers to scrutinize a lack of active protest
or clear objection to the impugned conduct in assessing whether the conduct was,
or ought reasonably to have been, understood as “unwelcome”. Tis efectively
places the burden of establishing a lack of consent with the complainant, and
indirectly suggests that active protest or objection may, in fact, be required
in order to establish a lack of consent in some circumstances. Indirectly, the
“unwelcome” element also invites scrutiny of a complainant’s credibility, calling
into question whether the impugned conduct occurred, and if it did, whether it
was, in efect, consented to. For complainants who do not conform to perceived
expectations of victim behaviour or gender-based stereotypes, the “unwelcome”
element may create additional obstacles to establishing their complaint.
Finally, the “unwelcome” element can function to create a presumption of
consent in workplaces where particular conduct is normalized. In such cases,
the “unwelcome” element may require a complainant to actively communicate
non-consent, even where that conduct would be understood as presumptively
“unwelcome” in another context.64 Te emphasis placed on a lack of active
protest or objection in establishing the “unwelcome” element creates a context in
which complainants bear the burden of both communicating non-consent and
marshalling evidence to that efect. Where they are unable to do so, they risk an
interpretation that the impugned conduct will not reasonably be understood as
“unwelcome”, that their credibility will be called into question, and that their
complaint will possibly be dismissed.

64. Tis has been particularly critiqued in relation to work in the restaurant industry. See
Matulewicz, “Institutionalized Sexual Harassment”, supra note 21.
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II. CONSENT AND SEXUAL CONDUCT IN CRIMINAL AND
TORT LAW
Both criminal and tort law have incorporated elements of afrmative consent
for legal claims and ofences concerning sexual misconduct. Te shift towards
afrmative consent in each of these legal arenas has been grounded by concerns
about reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes, and on the impropriety
of requiring a complainant to prove a lack of consent in certain circumstances.
Examining the shifts towards afrmative consent in criminal and tort law
provides important points of comparison in arguing for a similar shift for sexual
harassment complaints under human rights law. In particular, I focus on how
similar substantive problems support a structural shift in terms of who bears
the burden to establish (non-)consent. Nonetheless, there are two obvious
diferences in the relevant laws under criminal and tort law, as opposed to human
rights law, relating to the nature of the impugned conduct, and to the requisite
element of intent.
First, unlike human rights complaints, sexual ofences under criminal law
and the tort of battery are each limited to physical misconduct. Human rights
complaints, including sexual harassment, encompass a wider range of misconduct,
both in nature and degree of severity. However, this broader ambit does not
detract from the purpose of the comparison made in this article, which is about
who bears the burden of (dis)proving consent, and why that matters in light of
identifed concerns regarding reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes in
the assessment of legal complaints in each of these arenas.
Second, while intent features prominently in the criminal law governing
sexual ofences, and in relation to the tort of battery, it is not a required element
for establishing a complaint in human rights law.65 However, this operates in a
manner not dissimilar to the way in which intent is understood in tort law. Under
intentional torts, like battery, a person must intend to bring about the material
consequences of their conduct, but this does not necessarily require an intent
to harm, or in other words, a malicious motive. Incidents of discrimination,
particularly of sexual harassment, may be similarly understood in that the
impugned conduct is a product of the respondent’s conscious mind, even if they
do not understand it as discriminatory or harmful conduct. Further, as with
the diferences regarding impugned conduct, while the diferences in relation
to intent speak to the diferent purposes and functions of these areas of law,
65. See e.g. BC Code, supra note 18, s 2.
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it does not impact signifcantly on the purpose of the comparison being made
in this article.
A. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT UNDER CRIMINAL LAW

Sexual ofences in criminal law shifted to an afrmative consent standard in
the mid-1990s.66 Widely documented issues regarding the propagation of rape
myths and gender-based stereotypes in sexual assault trials were a motivating
factor for this change. Tese myths included the “hue and cry” stereotype (the
notion that “real victims” will fght back or immediately cry for help); the “real
rape” stereotype (sexual assaults are committed by a stranger on an unsuspecting
victim); and the “party girl” stereotype (that “bad girls” are more likely to
consent).67 A number of changes to the criminal law have aimed to negate reliance
on such myths and stereotypes in sexual assault trials, including the removal of
the “recent complaint” requirement (which had allowed for an adverse inference
on credibility to be drawn where a complainant did not disclose the assault at
the frst reasonable opportunity following the assault);68 the introduction of rape
shield provisions (which restricted the ability to examine a complainant about
their past sexual history in a sexual assault trial);69 the pronouncement in R v.
Mills that the accused’s right to make full answer and defence does not permit
counsel to use myths and stereotypes to “distort the truth-seeking goal of the trial
process”;70 and the shift to afrmative consent.71
Te essential elements of establishing a sexual ofence, such as sexual assault,
under the Criminal Code requires the Crown to establish that the complainant
did not consent.72 Te adoption of afrmative consent under criminal law does
66. For a detailed review of relevant changes to criminal law as it relates to sexual assault, see
Janine Benedet, “Judicial Misconduct in the Sexual Assault Trial” (2019) 52 UBC L Rev 1
at 7-18. As Benedet explains, these included changes to evidentiary rules in the 1980s, and
subsequent changes to consent law in the 1990s.
67. See Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra note 8 at 37; Ehrlich, supra note 8 at 391, citing
Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Harvard University Press, 1987); Elaine Craig, “Te Relevance
of Delayed Disclosure to Complainant Credibility in Cases of Sexual Ofence” (2011) 36
Queen’s LJ 551 [Craig, “Relevance of Delayed”]. See also Randall, “Ideal Victims”, supra note
8 at 398; Gotell, “Rethinking Afrmative Consent”, supra note 8; Rakhi Ruparelia, “Does
No ‘No’ Mean Reasonable Doubt? Assessing the Impact of Ewanchuk on Determinations of
Consent” (2006) 25 Can Woman Studies 167.
68. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 275 [Criminal Code].
69. Ibid, ss 276(1)(a)-276(1)(b).
70. [1999] 3 SCR 668 at para 90.
71. Criminal Code, supra note 68, s 273.1(1).
72. Ibid, s 271; R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330 at para 23 [Ewanchuk].
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not operate to shift the burden of proof to an accused.73 Like any criminal
ofence, sexual ofences are composed of both an actus reus and a mens rea, and
the Crown must prove each beyond a reasonable doubt. For the purposes of actus
reus, “consent” in cases of sexual ofences means “that the complainant in her
mind wanted the sexual touching to take place.”74 Te focus is solely on what
the complainant believed in her mind at the time. Tis creates space in which
a complainant’s credibility and version of events can continue to be challenged,
and in which gender-based myths and stereotypes may be introduced and relied
upon in order to do so.
For the purposes of mens rea, and whether the accused raises the defence
of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, “consent” means that
“the complainant had afrmatively communicated by words or conduct her
agreement to engage in [the] sexual activity with the accused.”75 Te focus here
shifts to what the accused believed at the time the incident occurred, and whether
the accused honestly believed that the complainant communicated consent—i.e.,
that the “complainant efectively said ‘yes’ through her words and/or actions.”76
Tis formulation gives way to the defence of honest but mistaken belief, where
evidence of afrmative consent is required for the accused to establish the defence.
Te Criminal Code adopted and frst codifed afrmative consent standards
in 1992 when Parliament introduced Bill C-49,77 which defned and limited
consent in sections 273.1(1) to 273.1(3), requiring that afrmative consent be
given before engaging in sexual activity. Afrmative consent requires active and
continuing communication of consent.78 Silence and passivity do not constitute
consent; neither does ambiguous conduct.79 Contemporaneous, afrmative
consent must be given for each and every sexual act regardless of the relationship.80
73. Te state is responsible for proving each element of a criminal ofence. Tis burden lies with
the Crown and never shifts to the accused. Tis is because every individual who is accused of
a crime is entitled to be presumed innocent until proven guilty as guaranteed by the Charter.
See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 11(d), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (describing a presumption that
can only be displaced upon proof of the constituent elements beyond a reasonable doubt).
74. Ewanchuk, supra note 72 at para 48.
75. Ibid at para 49.
76. Ibid at para 47.
77. Criminal Code, supra note 68, s 265(4).
78. Ewanchuk, supra note 72 at paras 49, 51; R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at para 90 [Barton];
R v Goldfnch, 2019 SCC 38 at para 44 [Goldfnch]; R v JA, 2011 SCC 28 at paras 34,
47 [JA]; R v Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19 at para 27.
79. Ewanchuk, supra note 72 at para 51.
80. Goldfnch, supra note 78 at para 44; JA, supra note 78 at para 34.
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Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the Crown must still prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the complainant did not consent to the impugned conduct. While
this does not require establishing active protest or objection, the complainant’s
credibility and state of mind may continue to play a role in assessing this element
of the ofence, providing space in which gender-based myths and stereotypes may
continue to be introduced and relied upon.
An accused may raise the defence of honest but mistaken belief in
communicated consent. Tis is a mistake of fact defence. A mistake of fact
defence “operates where the accused mistakenly perceived facts that negate,
or raise a reasonable doubt about, the fault element of the ofence.”81 In order for
the defence of mistaken belief to apply, the evidence must show that the accused
“believed the complainant communicated consent to engage in the sexual activity
in question.”82 In other words, the defendant must establish that he honestly
believed that the complainant communicated consent, that she “said ‘yes’ through
her words and/or actions.”83
In order to avail himself of this defence, an accused must also show that he
took “reasonable steps” to ascertain consent (section 273.2(b)).84 Te reasonable
steps requirement has both objective and subjective dimensions: Te accused
must take steps that are objectively reasonable to ascertain the consent of the
complainant, and the reasonableness of those steps must be assessed in light
of the circumstances known to the accused at the time.85 Te purpose of the
“reasonable steps” requirement was recently set out in Barton:
Te purpose of the reasonable steps requirement has been expressed in diferent ways.
Te authors of Manning, Mewett & Sankof: Criminal Law state that s. 273.2(b) of
the Code seeks “to protect the security of the person and equality of women who
comprise the huge majority of sexual assault victims by ensuring as much as possible
that there is clarity on the part of both participants to a sexual act” (M. Manning and
P. Sankof, Manning, Mewett & Sankof: Criminal Law (5th ed. 2015), at p. 1094
(footnote omitted)). Abella J.A. (as she then was) wrote in Cornejo that the reasonable
steps requirement “replaces the assumptions traditionally — and inappropriately —
associated with passivity and silence” (para. 21). Professor Elizabeth Sheehy puts
it this way: “Bill C-49’s ‘reasonable steps’ requirement was intended to criminalize
sexual assaults committed by men who claim mistake without any efort to ascertain
the woman’s consent or whose belief in consent relies on self-serving misogynist
beliefs” (p. 492). Te common thread running through each of these descriptions is
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Barton, supra note 78 at para 95, citing Pappajohn v the Queen, [1980] 2 SCR 120 at 148.
Ewanchuk, supra note 72 at para 46 [emphasis in original].
Ibid at para 47.
Criminal Code, supra note 68.
Barton, supra note 78 at para 104.
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this: the reasonable steps requirement rejects the outmoded idea that women can be
taken to be consenting unless they say “no”.86

In Barton, Justice Moldaver noted that any steps taken that are “based on rape
myths or stereotypical assumptions about women and consent cannot constitute
reasonable steps.”87 Te reasonable steps requirement buttresses the shift to
afrmative consent by explicitly removing the ability for an accused to rely
on silence, passivity, or perhaps even “mixed signals,” as well as gender-based
stereotypes, in order to justify their conduct. Tis requirement thus clearly and
fnitely rejects any continued reliance on express rejection or communications of
non-consent as relevant, let alone pivotal, in determining consent in the context
of sexual assault. Tis is an important mechanism to better ensure that afrmative
consent is efective as a legal principle.
Further buttressing the shift to afrmative consent is the principle that the
defence of mistaken belief will not apply where the mistake is one of law, including
in relation to “what counts as consent.”88 Mistakes of law include: that unless a
woman says “no,” she has implicitly given her consent (i.e., “implied consent”);89
that because a woman consented once, she will always consent again (i.e., “broad
consent”);90 and that because a woman is sexually active, she is more likely to
have consented to the sexual activity in question (i.e., “propensity to consent”).91
Te legal principles surrounding afrmative consent in sexual assault law—
including that mistaken belief can only form a valid defence where the accused
took reasonable steps to ascertain consent, and that it does not apply in cases of
mistake of law (including what counts as consent)—evidence a clear rejection of
reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes, as well as an acknowledgment
of the ways in which these myths and stereotypes have previously arisen and
have been used problematically in relation to sexual assault trials and the issue of
consent. As noted above, however, the requirement under criminal law for the
Crown to prove that the complainant did not consent as part of its prima facie case
continues to facilitate the introduction of gender-based myths and stereotypes.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Ibid at para 105.
Ibid at para 107.
Ibid at para 96.
Ibid at para 98.
JA, supra note 78.
R v Seaboyer, [1991] 2 SCR 577.
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B. CONSENT AS A DEFENCE IN TORT LAW

In Scalera, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the nature of the
relationship between sexual battery and consent in the context of an insurance
indemnifcation and duty to defend dispute.92 At the time of this decision, it was
well established that the intentional tort of battery treated consent as a defence
that it was incumbent on a defendant to establish in order to alleviate themselves
of liability. In Scalera, the arguments put forth required the Court to determine
whether sexual battery was distinct in ways that justifed a departure from the
general treatment of consent in intentional torts.93 Te majority and dissenting
opinions disagreed on the issue of consent, and specifcally on whether it should
continue to operate as a defence in the context of sexual battery, or whether
it should form part of the prima facie case that the plaintif has the burden to
prove.94 In other words, the question before the Supreme Court was whether
to treat sexual battery distinctly from battery, and whether, in turn, to depart
from the established principle that consent is a defence for the defendant in an
intentional tort claim to establish.
Te majority concluded that there was no principled reason to depart from
the ordinary legal principles governing battery and the defence of consent. Te
majority relied on four arguments in this respect: frst, maintaining consent as
a defence makes sense given the relative positions of the parties;95 second, the
underlying objectives and purposes of tort law, and of battery, are best served
by maintaining consent as a defence;96 third, the requirement for contact to be
“harmful or ofensive” does not equate with it being prima facie non-consensual
(and thus, part of the plaintif’s case to prove);97 and, fourth, shifting the burden
of proof to the plaintif for sexual battery would give rise to potential issues
around “victim-blaming” known to exist in criminal law.98
Writing for the majority, Justice McLachlin drew on well-established
principles governing the intentional tort of battery to ground the conclusion
that consent is a defence to the intentional tort of sexual battery, and that the
plaintif need only prove direct and intentional physical contact or interference

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Scalera, supra note 9. Scalera remains the sole leading authority on this issue.
Ibid at paras 1-36, 53, 95-109.
Ibid at paras 1-36, 103-109.
Ibid at para 13.
Ibid at paras 8-11.
Ibid at paras 17-26.
Ibid at paras 28-34.
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with her person to make out the prima facie claim.99 In the majority’s view, the
tort of battery “is based on protecting individuals’ right to personal autonomy.”100
Te tort of battery “starts from the presumption that apart from the usual and
inevitable contacts of ordinary life, each person is entitled not to be touched….
Te sexual touching itself, absent the defendant showing lawful excuse, constitutes
the violation….”101 As such, a direct interference with an individual’s physical
integrity, whether of a sexual nature or otherwise, constitutes the prima facie tort
and, as the majority notes, “the onus shifts to the person who is alleged to have
violated the right to justify the intrusion.”102
While part of the majority’s reasoning relies on the direct and immediate
nature of the conduct in relation to the injury,103 the reasons also focus on the
relative positions between the parties. As Justice McLachlin notes, “the defendant
is likely to know how and why the interference occurred….[I]f the defendant
is in a position to say what happened, it is both sensible and just to give him
an incentive to do so by putting the burden of explanation on him.”104 Tese
reasons are particularly compelling in considering who should bear the burden
of establishing consent. Tis approach focuses attention on the defendant to
justify their conduct and explain the reasons underlying their behaviour. Notably,
this aligns with the requirements and purpose of the honest but mistaken belief
defence in criminal law.
While the dissenting opinion would have imported a fault-based requirement,
such that the plaintif would be required to establish that the defendant knew or
ought to have known that she was not consenting to the conduct, the majority
rejects this, noting that such an approach would “subordinate the plaintif’s right
to protection from invasions of her physical integrity to the defendant’s freedom
to act.”105 In other words, making the plaintif prove fault—in this case, a lack
of consent—privileges and prioritizes the defendant’s “freedom to act” over the
plaintif’s right to physical integrity. In areas of law, like torts and human rights,
where the central focus is on remedying wrongs and harms caused to persons,
the interests of the person who has experienced the harm or wrong (the plaintif
under tort law, or complainant under human rights law) should be prioritized.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Ibid at para 7.
Ibid at para 10.
Ibid at para 22.
Ibid at para 10.
Ibid at para 11.
Ibid at para 13, citing Ruth Sullivan, “Trespass to the Person in Canada: A Defence of the
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A fault-based approach that requires the plaintif to establish a lack of consent
would create the opposite situation and thus depart in unjustifable ways from
the underlying objectives and functions of the law. Rather, where the plaintif can
establish the interference, and therefore the violation of their autonomy “[t]he
law may then fairly call upon the person thus implicated to explain, if he can.”106
Similar justifcations exist in human rights law, given its core purpose of
remedying discrimination experienced by individuals.
Turning to the issue of consent and gender-based stereotyping, the majority
summarizes the main argument against treating consent as a defence in respect
of sexual battery:
Te proposition that the law should require a plaintif in an action for sexual battery
to prove that she did not consent, is supported, it is suggested, by a requirement that
the contact involved in battery must be harmful or ofensive. Te argument may be
summarized as follows. Te plaintif must prove all the essential elements of the tort
of battery. One of these is that the contact complained of was inherently harmful or
ofensive on an objective standard. Consensual sexual contact is neither harmful nor
ofensive. Terefore the plaintif, in order to make out her case, must prove that she
did not consent or that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not
have thought she consented.107

Tis argument relies on the “non-trivial” threshold of contact that constitutes
battery. In other words, battery generally provides a legal claim for “non-trivial”
contact, which this argument suggests should be equated with “harmful or
ofensive” contact. While the majority agrees that contact meeting the threshold
for the tort of battery must be “harmful or ofensive,” this does not equate with
“non-consensual.”108 Te assertion that battery requires “harmful or ofensive”
contact “refects the needs to exclude from battery the casual contacts inevitable
in ordinary life”;109 it does not seek to communicate a requirement that “the
contact was physically or psychologically injurious or morally ofensive.”110
Te majority reminds that “[i]f one accepts that the foundation of the tort
of battery is a violation of personal autonomy, it follows that all contact outside
the exceptional category of contact that is generally accepted or expected in the
course of ordinary life, is prima facie ofensive.”111 From that, then, the question
106. Scalera, supra note 9 at para 15.
107. Ibid at para 17. A version of this argument is also relied upon in the dissenting opinion. See
ibid at para 53.
108. Ibid at para 18.
109. Ibid at para 22.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid at para 18.
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becomes whether sexual conduct comes within the “exceptional category”
of generally accepted or expected conduct. Te majority fnds that clearly it does
not.112 As the majority concludes:
Te sort of conduct the cases envision is the inevitable contact that goes with
ordinary human activity, like brushing someone’s hand in the course of exchanging
a gift, a gratuitous handshake, or being jostled in a crowd. Sexual contact does not
fall into this category. It is not the casual, accidental or inevitable consequence of
general human activity and interaction.113

Te majority opinion inScalera explicitly addressed issues regarding victim-blaming
and the inappropriate shift in inquiry that would result from requiring a plaintif
to prove a lack of consent to sexual battery.114 It further drew on established
lessons from criminal law in this regard. In particular, the majority notes, quoting
Bruce Feldthusen, that “enquiries into alleged consent have allowed the focus of
the criminal trial to shift from the actions of the defendant to the character of
the complainant. Te same potential exists in tort law.”115 Te majority articulates
what this would look like in the context of requiring a plaintif to prove a lack of
consent in the prima facie claim for sexual battery:
[b]y requiring the plaintif to prove more than the traditional battery claim requires,
we inappropriately shift the focus of the trial from the defendant’s behaviour to the
plaintif’s character. Requiring the plaintif to prove that a reasonable person in the
position of the defendant would have known that she was not consenting requires her
to justify her actions. In practical terms, she must prove that she made it clear through
her conduct and words that she did not consent to the sexual contact. Her conduct, not
the defendant’s, becomes the primary focus from the outset. If she cannot prove
these things, she will be non-suited and the defendant need never give his side of
the story.116

Tis is signifcant as the very same issue and result can, and does, appear in sexual
harassment complaints, as demonstrated earlier. Te majority further buttresses
this conclusion through express reference to Parliament’s views in amending
criminal law to adopt an afrmative consent model for sexual ofences, which the

112.
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majority states as a move to “counteract the historic tendency of criminal trials
for sexual assault to focus unduly on the behaviour of the complainant.”117
As Part III takes up in greater detail, the analysis and conclusion that consent
is properly viewed as a defence in sexual battery claims under tort law, coupled
with the shift towards an afrmative consent standard in criminal law, provide a
frm foundation to argue for a similar shift in sexual harassment law, one which
would be adequately efected by removing the “unwelcome” element.

III. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF (DIS)PROVING
“UNWELCOME” CONDUCT IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW
As seen in the criminal law and tort law contexts, where a complainant bears the
burden of proving a lack of consent, this inevitably shifts the focus of the inquiry
towards her character and conduct, rather than focusing on the defendant’s
conduct and its impact on the complainant. Part I of this article illustrated
how the “unwelcome” element of the test for sexual harassment may operate
to efectively require a complainant to establish a lack of consent, and how that
has manifested in ways which scrutinize the complainant’s own character and
behaviour rather than focusing on the respondent’s conduct. Te “unwelcome”
element, both in principle and in practice, produces problematic consequences
for complainants of sexual harassment under human rights law. Specifcally,
the “unwelcome” element allows for the introduction of gender-based myths
and stereotypes that may negatively infuence the analysis and outcome of the
complaint. Tese stereotypes arise where there is a presumption of consent,
where a complainant is required to disprove her consent, or where her response
is less than a clear and unequivocal rejection of sexual advances, and they may be
used to cast suspicion on the complainant’s credibility.
Te shift towards afrmative consent in criminal law and the afrmation of
consent as a defence to sexual battery in tort law were each grounded in response
to the problematic consequences associated with gender-based stereotyping in
relation to instances of sexual misconduct. Te examinations of criminal and
tort law’s approaches to consent provide support for rejecting the “unwelcome”
element in sexual harassment complaints. Te comparison functions to illustrate,
frst, that similar problems concerning gender-based stereotyping arise when
the burden of disproving consent rests with a complainant in legal complaints
117. Ibid at para 32.
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involving sexual misconduct across an array of bodies of law and, second, that
consistent approaches to the burden for establishing consent across these legal
arenas can similarly work to ameliorate those problems.
Te boundaries created by strict conduct and intent elements in both
criminal and tort law supported the courts’ and legislatures’ legal approaches to
consent in those arenas. Nonetheless, while criminal and tort law have narrower
boundaries in defning legal claims and ofences, these are inherently connected
to their purposes and functions within the larger legal system. Human rights law
similarly creates appropriate boundaries around what constitutes discrimination
in a manner consistent with advancing its purpose and function. As such,
it can readily provide sufcient boundaries around sexual harassment as a form
of discrimination without continued reliance on the “unwelcome” element in
establishing the prima facie complaint.
To begin, it is important to explain that the test for sexual harassment
deviates from the general test for discrimination under human rights law.
In a discrimination complaint, a complainant must generally establish: (1)
that they have a protected characteristic (such as, for the purposes of a sexual
harassment complaint: sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression,
marital or family status);118 (2) that they experienced an adverse impact or
treatment; and (3) that their protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse
impact or treatment.119 Unlike the test for sexual harassment, the general test for
discrimination does not require a complainant to establish that the adverse impact
or treatment they experienced was “unwelcome,” nor is consent raised as an issue
in other indirect ways in the prima facie complaint. Rather, a respondent may
be excused from liability where they can establish justifcation for the impugned
conduct, such as where a job criterion is a “bona fde occupational requirement”
or where the respondent can establish that they accommodated the complainant
to the point of undue hardship.120
Tese existing legal principles governing discrimination complaints, coupled
with existing constraints on defning relevant conduct in sexual harassment

118. For a list of relevant protected grounds in the employment context, see e.g. BC Code, supra
note 18, s 13; Ontario Code, supra note 18, ss 5(1)-5(2), 7(2).
119. Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 [Moore].
120. See e.g. ibid at para 49; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la
jeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at para
37 [Bombardier].
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complaints,121 are sufcient to respond to sexual harassment complaints
without a continued reliance on the additional burden of establishing that
the impugned conduct (or “adverse treatment”) was “unwelcome”. In a case
of sexual harassment, the protected characteristic factor does not raise unique
concerns. Similarly, establishing a nexus between the protected characteristic and
the adverse treatment is unlikely, in the context of sexual harassment, to create
distinct issues, given the sexual nature of the misconduct typically at issue.122 Te
crux of the uncertainty in incorporating sexual harassment under the general
test for discrimination is located within the second element, identifying what
constitutes “adverse treatment.” Tis is where the “unwelcome” element has
historically served as a boundary or threshold element. However, as human
rights law and the test for discrimination have evolved signifcantly in the past
few decades, existing principles and interpretations are sufcient to operate as a
boundary or threshold without the “unwelcome” element, and in a manner that
arguably better advances the underlying purposes of human rights law.
Te above proposal, that sexual harassment complaints can be properly dealt
with under the general test for discrimination, will inevitably raise concerns,
similar to those seen in criminal and tort law, about whether such a proposal
improperly expands the ambit or reach of the law, or would open the “foodgates”
of litigation. I ofer four responses. First, the underlying purposes of human rights
law justify a broader ambit of conduct that may be captured as discrimination,
making the wider scope compatible with the nature and function of human rights
law. Second, existing principles setting out the threshold of what constitutes
discriminatory conduct and “adverse treatment” function to create sufcient
boundaries in light of the purposes of human rights law. Tird, concerns about
opening the foodgates of complaints and false complaints by consenting sexual
partners are unwarranted, both because existing legal and procedural principles
attending human rights law sufciently guard against such claims and because
such concerns, to an extent, propagate gender-based stereotypes. Finally, insofar
as consent and “welcomed” conduct will remain an aspect of sexual harassment
complaints, it can and should be treated as a justifcation, the burden of which is
on the respondent to establish.
121. As described in Part I of this article, above. See Pardo, supra note 27 (the requirement for
persistent conduct in cases of verbal complaint); Eva, supra note 26 (the principle that not all
negative interactions will constitute a sufcient adverse impact).
122. For a discussion of this element of sexual harassment law in British Columbia, see Hastie,
“Tribunal Decisions”, supra note 25. See also Hastie, “Workplace Sexual Harassment”,
supra note 5 (discussing this element in British Columbia and Ontario case law
from 2000 to 2018).
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Turning frst to the underlying purposes of human rights law, this body of
law is seen as “quasi-constitutional”123 and derived from the guarantee of equality
under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Human rights
codes, as statutory instruments, typically set out a variety of purposes, including
to foster equality and inclusion, promote human dignity, prevent discrimination,
and address inequality.124 Human rights complaints, as a vehicle through which
individuals may seek redress for discriminatory or unequal treatment, are focused
squarely on the impact to the complainant,125 refecting a core remedial purpose
for human rights law. Focusing on the impact to the complainant in assessing a
discrimination complaint, as refected in the requirement for a complainant to
establish that they experienced adverse treatment, properly focuses the inquiry on
the discriminatory treatment and its consequences for a complainant. In light of
this, legal principles like the “unwelcome” element under sexual harassment law,
which invite scrutiny of a complainant’s own behaviour, not only detract from,
but risk undermining, this core purpose. Further, given that human rights law
is centrally concerned with the impact on the complainant, it makes sense that
intent to discriminate is not a requirement, only the efect of discrimination.
Finally, the core remedial or compensatory focus of human rights law, as focused
on the complainant, necessitates a broad ambit of misconduct to be captured,
which itself refects the reality that discrimination takes myriad and often
insidious forms.
In light of the underlying core remedial purpose of human rights law,
existing legal principles have developed to properly identify the boundaries
of what misconduct constitutes discrimination and what falls below that
threshold. Tese existing legal principles can, and already do, apply to sexual
harassment complaints. Sexual harassment law has developed to create unique
and, as I have argued, heightened standards for establishing discrimination.
Tis heightened standard is unnecessary in light of the general legal principles
that apply to discrimination complaints. Moreover, the heightened standard is
harmful, given the ways in which the “unwelcome” element invites a reliance on
gender-based myths and stereotypes, and improperly focuses the inquiry on the
complainant’s own conduct.

123. See e.g. Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v Newfoundland (Green Bay Health Care
Centre), [1996] 2 SCR 3 at para 20.
124. See e.g. BC Code, supra note 18, s 3; Ontario Code, supra note 18, preamble.
125. See e.g. British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at paras
87-90, Abella J.
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In general, it is a well-established principle under human rights law that
not all negative remarks, comments, or conduct constitute discrimination.126
Tus, human rights law already sets boundaries around conduct in a manner
not dissimilar to the tort of battery’s threshold for “non-trivial” contact. Second,
the requirement for a complainant to establish adverse treatment or an adverse
impact means that only misconduct that has a demonstrable negative impact on a
complainant will constitute discrimination. Tis “adverse treatment” or “adverse
impact” element often takes the form of a penalty, exclusion, or diferential
treatment.127 Tis element of the general test for discrimination sets an important
boundary and threshold around complaints of all kinds, guarding against
“foodgates” concerns without inappropriately shifting the focus of the inquiry
onto the complainant’s own behaviour or conduct.
When assessing sexual harassment complaints, and examining the alleged
discriminatory conduct, physical conduct is unlikely to generate signifcant
ambiguity or concern, as it is more readily understood as presumptively
inappropriate.128 Te challenge in advancing an argument to reject the
“unwelcome” element is more likely to arise in assessing verbal conduct. As with
other forms of verbal misconduct, there is a presumption of persistence required
to meet the threshold of sexual harassment under human rights law. Tis means
that, absent exceptional circumstances (set out in Pardo), for verbal misconduct
or harassment to constitute discrimination (whether based on sex or other
protected characteristics), it must generally be repeated behaviour.129 In other
words, not all negative comments will automatically constitute discrimination
or sexual harassment, whether assessed under current sexual harassment law
or under the general test for discrimination. Importantly, this legal principle
maintains an established threshold in establishing discriminatory conduct,
including verbal sexual harassment, without the need to require a complainant
to also establish that such conduct was “unwelcome.” Tis approach aligns with
the core remedial purpose of human rights law and its focus on impact, while
also maintaining a threshold that guards against frivolous claims and preserves
administrative resources.

126. See e.g. Eva, supra note 26 at para 80. Eva held that “not every negative incident that is
connected to sex will be discriminatory” (citing Hadzic v Pizza Hut Canada (cob Pizza Hut),
1999 BCHRT 44).
127. See e.g. Bombardier, supra note 120 at para 42.
128. See Hastie, “Tribunal Decisions”, supra note 25.
129. See Eva, supra note 26 at para 80, citing Pardo, supra note 27 at para 12.
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Te greatest objection to removing the “unwelcome” element from sexual
harassment complaints under human rights law is likely to come in the form of
the “foodgates” concern. In one iteration or another, this objection essentially
boils down to concerns that, without this element, human rights tribunals
will be fooded with an unmanageable number of claims; the removal of this
requirement would unreasonably enlarge the legal defnition of what constitutes
sexual harassment; or the removal of this element will generate an increased
number of frivolous or unmeritorious claims.
Te removal of the “unwelcome” element and incorporation of
sexual harassment under the general test for discrimination is unlikely to
unreasonably enlarge the legal defnition of sexual harassment. Tis is because,
as I have discussed above, the existing legal principles governing what misconduct
constitutes discrimination (including sexual harassment), coupled with the
requirement for a complainant to demonstrate adverse treatment or impact,
creates sufcient boundaries around what is, and is not, discrimination under
human rights law, including in respect of sexual harassment. Te “unwelcome”
element, which represents the key departure in sexual harassment law from
general anti-discrimination law, does not create further boundaries around what
constitutes sexually harassing conduct, nor on what constitutes an adverse impact.
It efectively requires a complainant to establish, in addition to those elements,
a lack of consent. Tis is an element that individuals bringing other discrimination
complaints are generally not required to establish.130 Tere is no principled reason
to be concerned that the proposed shift would substantially enlarge the defnition
of what constitutes sexual harassment. Tere is also no evidentiary basis to be
concerned about an unmanageable volume of complaints. Again, discrimination
complaints outside of sexual harassment have well-developed processes and legal
principles, and they have not produced these issues. Tus, there is no principled
reason to treat sexual harassment complaints diferently from other discrimination
complaints—a conclusion similarly reached in Scalera in rejecting diferential
treatment of sexual battery from the general tort of battery.

130. See Ontario Code, supra note 18. Te Ontario Code defnes “harassment” under section 10
and includes the “unwelcome” element. Under the Ontario Code, harassment is prohibited in
a number of contexts and individuals claiming harassment in other contexts may be similarly
required to establish that the impugned conduct was “unwelcome.” See Janzen, supra note 1.
Racial harassment, specifcally, has historically adopted this defnitional element from Janzen
and would similarly beneft from its removal. For an analysis of racial harassment claims,
see e.g. Michael Hall, “Racial Harassment in Employment: An Assessment of the Analytical
Approaches” (2006) 13 CLELJ 229.

448

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Second, regardless of the potential volume of complaints, the “foodgates”
argument often centres on the specter of frivolous and unmeritorious complaints
in relation to sexual misconduct and sex equality. Tis is particularly troubling as
such arguments implicitly propagate the very gender-based stereotypes that legal
and policy reforms aim to ameliorate. As the Court in Scalera noted, when faced
with a similar argument,
[f ]ew plaintifs to consensual sex or in situations where consent is a reasonable
inference from the circumstances, are likely to sue if they are virtually certain to
lose when the facts come out. Moreover, the rules of court provide sanctions for
vexatious litigants. Tere is no need to change the law of battery to avoid vexatious
claims.131

Similarly, concerns that vindictive (female) colleagues will bring frivolous or false
discrimination complaints against their (male) counterparts are unwarranted.
First, as with civil courts, most individuals are not likely to bring frivolous
or unmeritorious claims to a human rights tribunal; they are likely to lose
such claims and expend considerable resources in the process. Second, the
suggestion that sexual harassment complainants are more or uniquely likely
to bring frivolous or false complaints, as compared with other complainants
of discrimination, implicitly relies on problematic gender-based stereotypes of
women as vindictive and vengeful, not dissimilar to the historical stereotyping
relied on in the criminal justice system and other contexts. Tird, as with
civil courts, there are well-developed procedures in place to address frivolous,
vexatious, and unmeritorious complaints in the human rights system.132 Tere
131. Scalera, supra note 9 at para 24.
132. In direct access jurisdictions like British Columbia and Ontario, complaints may be screened
at a preliminary stage, and may be dismissed on preliminary application where they have
“no chance of success”: see BC Code, supra note 18, s 27(1)(c); “Human Rights Tribunal of
Ontario Rules of Procedure” (2017) online (pdf ): Tribunals Ontario <tribunalsontario.ca/
documents/hrto/Practice%20Directions/HRTO%20Rules%20of%20Procedure.html> at
Rule 19A. Further, direct access jurisdictions typically adopt an early intervention approach
where adjudicators oversee a complaint from the early stages and may further advise on
the matter: see “Applicant’s Guide to Filing an Application with the HRTO”, online (pdf ):
Tribunals Ontario <tribunalsontario.ca/documents/hrto/Guides/Applicants%20Guide.
html#8e>; “Steps in the Human Rights Complaints Process”, online (pdf ): BC Human
Rights Tribunal <www.bchrt.bc.ca/complaint-process/steps.htm>. In other jurisdictions,
a Human Right Commission similarly functions to screen applications at an early stage,
providing opportunity for dismissal of a complaint following a preliminary investigation:
see e.g. “Te Complaint Process”, online (pdf ): Manitoba Human Rights Commission
<www.manitobahumanrights.ca/v1/complaints/complaints-fling-a-complaint.html>;
“How the Commission Intervenes”, online (pdf ): Commission des Droits de la Personne
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is, as above, no principled reason to be concerned uniquely or diferently about
sexual harassment complainants so as to justify the imposition of an additional
legal burden in establishing their complaint on this basis.
Overall, there is no principled basis upon which to continue to treat sexual
harassment complaints distinctly from other discrimination complaints under
existing human rights legislation. Moreover, to maintain a distinction will be
to maintain a higher threshold for establishing sexual harassment as a form of
discrimination, as compared to other forms of discrimination. Eliminating such
a distinction would further advance sex equality in the workplace. As Schultz
has noted, for example, the distinct legal treatment of sexual harassment has
encouraged a narrow construction of workplace issues as centred on sexual
misconduct, diverting attention away from broader and deeper recognition of sex
inequality in the workplace.133 Eliminating this distinction may, in turn, broaden
the focus of sex-based discrimination issues in the workplace, and complaints
under the human rights law system. Tis would, in turn, work towards greater
sex equality in the workplace.
Finally, turning to the issue of where and how consent should be dealt
with under human rights law, existing legal principles that allow a respondent
to provide justifcation for their conduct aford a more appropriate space in
which to consider this issue. If a complainant establishes a prima facie claim
of discrimination, the onus shifts to the defendant to justify their conduct
based on exemptions under relevant legislation and principles developed by the
courts.134 Courts have historically developed justifcation principles related to
bona fde occupational requirements and accommodation issues in the context
of employment.135 Nonetheless, courts and tribunals could similarly develop
principles that would allow a respondent to justify their conduct on the basis of a
reasonable belief that the conduct was “welcomed” or consented to in the context
of sexual harassment. For example, tribunals could adopt and adapt a test similar
to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in criminal law. Tis would allow a
respondent to justify their conduct where they took reasonable steps to ascertain
the consent of the complainant or had a reasonable basis to believe their conduct
was welcomed. Te primary change in law proposed here is about who bears the
burden of establishing consent vis-à-vis the “unwelcome” element.
et des Droits de la Jeunesse <www.cdpdj.qc.ca/en/fle-a-complaint/complaints-process/
how-commission-intervenes>.
133. See Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”, supra note 14 at 66.
134. See e.g. Bombardier, supra note 120 at para 37.
135. See e.g. Moore, supra note 119 at para 49.
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Similar to the approaches in criminal and tort law, respondents in a
sexual harassment complaint should bear the onus of establishing consent
or “welcomeness” in relation to their conduct. Te burden of proof under
this approach is placed with the defendant (or, in the human rights context,
the respondent) who is, as the Court in Scalera noted, in the best position to
explain their conduct and the motivations behind it. Importantly, shifting
claims regarding consent to the justifcation stage minimizes the space in which
gender-based stereotypes and myths can be introduced and relied upon as a
way to directly undermine the prima facie claim. Tis is not a perfect solution,
however, and criminal law scholars in particular have noted the ways in which
gender-based stereotypes continue to surface in sexual assault cases.136
Afrmative consent-like principles come with their own set of challenges
and critiques.137 Concepts of afrmative consent, as examined especially in
criminal law contexts, risk oversimplifying experiences of sexual encounters and
behaviour.138 As such, these concepts risk being both over- and under-inclusive in
regulating sexual activity,139 and may communicate troubling moral judgments,
both about women’s sexuality and about ideas of women as vulnerable subjects.140
In similar ways, human rights law must be attentive to the normative judgments
it communicates and the ways in which these may pre-emptively shape social
behaviour, such as behaviour in the workplace.141 However, in light of the
documented problems arising from the current formulation of sexual harassment
law and the ways it impacts women, in particular, who do bring forward
legal complaints, the structural shift of who bears the burden of establishing
“welcomeness” is an important one to undertake. Tis would help alleviate
the focus of the inquiry from the complainant’s own conduct and credibility
and shift it towards the respondent’s conduct and motivations. Tis shift may
work towards minimizing the use of and reliance on gender-based stereotypes
in a discrimination complaint. It would also alleviate the heightened burden
that complainants of sexual harassment face as compared to those bringing
discrimination complaints on other bases. Finally, such a shift may create
larger space, both within and beyond the human rights law and adjudication
136. See e.g. Ruparelia, supra note 67; Craig, Putting Trials on Trial, supra note 8; Hastie,
“Unwelcome Requirement”, supra note 5.
137. See e.g. Gruber, supra note 10 at 430; Halley, Split Decisions, supra note 10; Halley,
“Afrmative Consent”, supra note 12 at 259; Matthews, supra note 11 at 275.
138. See e.g. Matthews, supra note 11 at 275.
139. See ibid at 275-80.
140. See e.g. Halley, “Afrmative Consent”, supra note 12 at 259.
141. See e.g. Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”, supra note 14 at 66-67.
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system, to engage in dialogue about appropriate workplace boundaries, sexual
behavior, and regulatory approaches to this, for which existing scholarship has
highlighted a need.142
Moreover, as “welcomeness” might be construed as a more fexible concept
than consent, the cautionary lessons to be learned from existing scholarship
that critique afrmative consent should be borne in mind. For example, some
critiques highlight the problems associated with establishing consent under a
binary “yes or no” formulation.143 Similarly, others draw attention to the ways
in which individuals may hold diferent understandings of what evidence or
behaviour constitutes consent.144 Requiring a respondent to establish that they
had a reasonable belief that their conduct was “welcomed” may allow for a more
nuanced consideration of evidence or facts, as it does not necessarily require a
binary approach to analysis, and provides space for a respondent to communicate
their subjective understanding of the situation and motivation for their
behaviour. Human rights law also operates more fexibly regarding evidentiary
standards, which may allow for a more fexible approach to the analysis in this
regard. However, while these factors may provide a partial response to critiques
of afrmative consent as it has operated in criminal law contexts, it is not a
perfect solution. Yet, insofar as a consent-like factor will remain a feature of
sexual harassment law, the burden ought to rest with the respondent, rather than
the complainant, to establish this.

IV. CONCLUSION
Tis article has argued for a shift in sexual harassment law that removes the
requirement for a complainant to establish that the impugned conduct was
“unwelcome.” Te “unwelcome” element has been critiqued for placing an
inappropriate burden on women to avoid harassment in the workplace, for
inviting improper scrutiny into a complainant’s own conduct in a complaint,
and for facilitating the use of gender-based stereotypes and myths in assessing a
sexual harassment complaint. Te use of, and reliance on, gender-based myths
and stereotypes to undermine the credibility of sexual harassment complainants,
and to question their consent to sexual conduct in the workplace, is troubling.
Te requirement that a complainant must establish that the impugned conduct
142. See e.g. Matthews, supra note 11 at 280-81; Halley, “Afrmative Consent”, supra note 12 at
271-73; Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”, supra note 14 at 90.
143. See e.g. Matthews, supra note 11 at 275; Gruber, supra note 10 at 449-50.
144. Gruber, supra note 10 at 417.
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was “unwelcome” improperly requires her to establish a lack of consent and
directly facilitates reliance on gender-based myths and stereotypes.
Similar problems concerning a reliance on gender-based myths and
stereotypes led to shifts towards afrmative consent standards in criminal and
tort law. As such, a similar shift ought to be undertaken in human rights law,
which would position the issue of consent or “welcomeness” as a justifcation,
rather than as part of the prima facie complaint. Tis would ameliorate existing
problems that women, in particular, face in bringing sexual harassment complaints
forward, and would create greater consistency between the treatment of sexual
harassment and other forms of discrimination under human rights law.
As social and legal understandings and expectations concerning consent
and sexual misconduct evolve, human rights law must keep pace. Te principles
governing sexual harassment complaints were decided over thirty years ago, and
much has changed in that time. It is urgent that sexual harassment law also evolve
to keep pace with contemporary understandings and expectations, particularly in
light of the central purpose of human rights law as remedying discrimination for
individual complainants, and in protecting and promoting equality, including in
the workplace. While much more is needed to achieve greater sex equality in the
workplace,145 a reconfguring of sexual harassment law as proposed above is one
important step towards this goal.

145. See Schultz, “Sanitized Workplace Revisited”, supra note 14 at 67.

